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FOREWORD 
Anthony W. Batts 
Public safety is of paramount importance in creating healthy communities. Because of the work of 
countless law enforcement professionals, crime today is down to a level not seen since the 1960s. In the 
last 25 years, violent and property crime has declined almost 50 percent. 
Yet along with this crime reduction have come inadvertent and costly consequences. Since 1990, the 
United States increased its incarcerated population by 61 percent. There are now 2.3 million Americans 
behind bars. If current trends persist, one in three African American men born today will be incarcerated in 
his lifetime. Not only do we live in an era of reduced crime, we also live in an era of excessive incarceration. 
We lock up too many — especially people of color — for too long, without a clear public safety rationale.
Over incarceration and racially disparate law enforcement are counterproductive to the goal of improving 
public safety. These policies call into question the legitimacy of the justice system. In Baltimore City, and in 
many urban minority communities, there is an inherent mistrust of people who wear police uniforms. By 
reversing these trends, we can actually better protect and serve our communities. Key reforms will restore 
the public’s trust in government. Rebuilding trust will increase the likelihood that citizens will work with 
law enforcement — police, prosecutors, judges, and corrections officials — to keep our neighborhoods safe 
and vibrant. 
Since beginning my career as a police officer over three decades ago, I have witnessed various changes 
in our field: from the dramatic decrease in crime, to a concentration on crime prevention, to today’s 
new focus on reducing incarceration and racial disparities while preserving public safety. How we police 
— and whom we police — is the subject of an important national conversation. A crucial part of this 
analysis is the role of race in our justice system. 
My experiences growing up a young black kid in South Central Los Angeles inform my view on this 
vital topic. I remember asking my mother whether any of our leaders cared about the black kids dying 
in our streets. My mother encouraged me to be a change agent. I have dedicated my career to that goal. 
How can we move forward to break harmful trends and reinforce beneficial ones? How can we keep our 
country safe while reducing incarceration and racial injustices in our system?
We can do what works. We can learn from successes based on tested innovations. We can improve 
our policies, practices, and every day decisions. In everything from policing to pretrial detention to 
prosecution to probation and parole, modern data-driven techniques can reduce crime without over-
relying on incarceration. These techniques can also reduce racial disparities. 
This report provides recommendations to reduce racial disparities in jails. It provides local actors with 
a roadmap to modernize how we enforce criminal laws. We can and should move away from selective 
enforcement and harsh punishment — which research tells us does not work — toward a system that 
is more effective and just. This important report provides a path to that goal.
Batts is the Police Commissioner for the City of Baltimore. He previously served as Chief of Police for 
Oakland and Long Beach, California. 
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LETTER FROM THE DIRECTORS
Inimai Chettiar & Nicole Austin-Hillery 
As we work to reduce racially disparate outcomes in our criminal justice system, we face two challenges. 
First, we must find a way to reduce racial disparities in the justice system without creating unnecessary 
polarization. Second, we must move beyond merely discussing the problem to firmly focus on solutions. 
This report seeks to advance both these goals. 
Recent controversies in Ferguson, Mo., Staten Island, N.Y., North Charleston, S.C., and Baltimore, 
Md., have reopened a national conversation on race, crime, and punishment. As we grapple with these 
issues, we must remember one critical point: The goals of increasing public safety, decreasing overreliance 
on incarceration, and decreasing racial disparities are not in tension. Research and experience have 
shown that we can do all three. Many leaders in law enforcement and corrections believe this as well.
In this report, we called upon the experts who oversee criminal justice every day — police, prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, judges, sheriffs, and corrections heads — to work with community leaders, advocates, 
and researchers to devise solutions. Through a Roundtable discussion held in October 2014, we asked 
these experts to propose changes to local practices that would lead to a reduction in racial and ethnic 
disparities reflected in the country’s jail population. Jails — as opposed to prisons — are largely a 
local function. They house individuals who have been arrested, those awaiting trial, and those serving 
sentences for low-level offenses. While participants recognized the need to change laws to achieve 
change in the system, the recommendations in this report focus on ways in which local actors can alter 
outcomes without legal changes. 
Based on the conversations and ideas generated by the Roundtable, this report sets forth concrete 
recommendations. We hope they prove valuable to practitioners, policymakers, and advocates. 
Chettiar is Director of the Brennan Center’s Justice Program. Austin-Hillery is Director and Counsel of the 
Brennan Center’s Washington, D.C. Office. 
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ROuNDTABLE PARTICIPANTS
On October 21-22, 2014, the Brennan Center hosted Racial and Ethnic Disparities in American Jails: 
A Roundtable Discussion, bringing together leading law enforcement, corrections officials, judges, 
practitioners, researchers, scholars, and advocates. 
During the Roundtable, experts discussed a variety of topics related to reducing racial disparities in 
the criminal justice system, including which reforms have worked to reduce disparities, how reducing 
racial disparities could be measured, and what reforms could achieve these goals. Participants focused 
on reforms to be implemented at the local level through changes to practices and decision making 
(instead of legal changes) to reduce racial disparities reflected in locally run jails (instead of federal and 
state prisons). 
The authors’ recommendations are based on ideas generated by the Roundtable discussions. 
While the report draws on statements by Roundtable participants to demonstrate the high impact 
these recommendations could have on reducing incarceration and racial disparities in jails, the 
recommendations of this report should not necessarily be ascribed to any individual participant. 
Experts participating in the Roundtable included:
•	 Nicole Austin-Hillery, Washington, D.C. Office Director, Brennan Center for Justice.
•	 Mario Barnes, Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development, University of California, 
Irvine School of Law. 
•	 Diane Beer-Maxwell, Program Manager, International Association of Chiefs of Police. 
•	 Spike Bradford, Director of Communications, Pretrial Justice Institute. 
•	 Paul Butler, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; former federal prosecutor. 
•	 Juan Cartagena, President and General Counsel, LatinoJustice PRLDEF. 
•	 Inimai Chettiar, Justice Program Director, Brennan Center for Justice.
•	 Michaela Davis, Criminal Justice and Drug Policy Attorney, ACLU of Northern California. 
•	 Cristine DeBerry, Chief of Staff, Office of District Attorney George Gascón, City and County 
of San Francisco. 
•	 Cynthia Figueroa, President and CEO, Congreso de Latinos Unidos. 
•	 Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Research Analyst, The Sentencing Project. 
•	 Greg Hamilton, Sheriff, Travis County, Texas. 
•	 Alan Jenkins, Executive Director, Opportunity Agenda. 
•	 Cynthia Jones, Associate Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University. 
•	 Tracie Keesee, Director of Research Partnerships, Center for Policing Equity; Project Director, 
Department of Justice National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice, John Jay 
College of Criminal Justice Network for Safe Communities; retired Captain, Denver Police 
Department.
•	 David LaBahn, President & CEO, Association of Prosecuting Attorneys; former Director, 
American Prosecutors Research Institute; former Director of Research and Development, 
National District Attorneys Association; former Deputy District Attorney, Orange and 
Humboldt Counties, California.
•	 Clinton Lacey, Director of the District of Columbia Department of Youth Rehabilitation 
Services, former Deputy Commissioner, Department of Probation, City of New York. 
•	 Marc Levin, Policy Director, Right on Crime; Director, Center for Effective Justice, Texas 
Public Policy Foundation.
•	 Glenn Martin, President, JustLeadership USA; former Vice President, Fortune Society. 
•	 Marc Mauer, Executive Director, The Sentencing Project.  
•	 Jerome McElroy, Executive Director, New York City Pretrial Justice Agency. 
•	 Rick Raemisch, Executive Director, Colorado Department of Corrections. 
•	 Norman Reimer, Executive Director, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; 
former criminal defense attorney, Gould Reimer Walsh Goffin Cohn LLP. 
•	 Hon. Louis Trosch, Jr., District Court Judge, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. 
•	 Nicholas Turner, President and Director, Vera Institute of Justice. 
•	 Arthur Wallenstein, Director, Department of Correction and Rehabilitation, Montgomery 
County, Maryland.
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EXECuTIVE SuMMARY
From October 21-22, 2014, the Brennan Center for Justice and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur 
Foundation convened a group of 25 criminal justice leaders — prosecutors, police, correctional officers, 
sheriffs, defense attorneys, community advocates, and researchers — at New York University School 
of Law for a series of discussions on racial disparities in local jails. Our goal for the two days: identify 
changes in local practices to reduce racial and ethnic disparities in jails, while alleviating unnecessary 
incarceration and maintaining public safety. 
People of color are overrepresented in the criminal justice system. Race, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, affects every discretionary point in the criminal justice system. Even race-neutral policies 
can yield differential treatment and outcomes. These disparate outcomes are commonly referred to as 
“racial and ethnic disparities.” While some crimes are disproportionately committed by certain races, 
which can produce some racial imbalances, this report seeks to reduce unjustified disparities in jails. 
Why focus on jails? Much attention has been given to racial disparities in our nation’s prisons, but 
they have not been fully examined in jails. “Jails” are city or county-level incarceration facilities. Unlike 
state prisons, which hold people convicted of crimes and serving longer sentences, jails primarily hold 
people awaiting trial and serving short sentences for low-level offenses. Jails provide a gateway to deeper 
entanglement in the criminal justice system. Often, decisions made before a defendant arrives at the 
jailhouse door — by police, prosecutors, judges, or others– result in the racial disparities that are 
eventually reflected in jails. These disparities in turn help create racial disparities throughout the rest of 
the criminal justice system. 
Roundtable participants identified the following drivers of racial and ethnic disparities in local systems: 
•	 Treatment of Low-Level Offenses: African Americans are almost four times more likely to be 
arrested for selling drugs and almost three times more likely to be arrested for possessing drugs, 
even though whites are more likely to sell drugs and equally likely to consume them. Research 
from various jurisdictions indicates that African Americans are also more likely to receive jail 
sentences when convicted of low-level offenses. 
•	 Overuse of Pre-Trial Detention: Studies consistently find that African American and Hispanic 
defendants are more than twice as likely to be detained in jail pending trial. Research indicates 
that pretrial detention significantly increases the likelihood that a defendant will be sentenced 
to incarceration after trial and for longer periods of time. 
•	 Parole and Probation Lengths and Revocations: African Americans and Hispanics remain on 
probation and parole longer than similarly situated white offenders. The longer the supervision 
term, the higher the chance of committing a low-level, technical violation of conditions and 
ending up back in jail. Longer supervision also decreases an individual’s ability to lead his or 
her life, including securing employment and housing. Failure to reintegrate successfully into 
society increases the likelihood of recidivism, which often results in re-incarceration. 
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•	 Perverse Financial Incentives: Throughout the criminal justice system, financial incentives are 
embedded in funding structures. They often directly or inadvertently encourage an increase in 
the number of arrests, pretrial detentions, prosecutions, convictions, or sentences. Too often, 
this is how “success” is measured in criminal justice. 
•	 Collection of Fees and Fines: The collection of court costs and other financial obligations from defendants 
disproportionately burdens African Americans and Hispanics who cannot pay. Aggressive collection 
practices result in onerous and compounding debt, and even jail stays, for many defendants.
•	 Unconscious Bias: Everyone has unconscious and unintentional biases that affect their 
understandings and actions. These biases may affect the decisions of criminal justice actors 
without their awareness, and result in racial and ethnic disparities. 
This report identifies changes to local practice to reduce these disparities while protecting public safety. 
Why focus on localities? Though Roundtable participants universally agreed that reforms to federal, 
state, and local laws are necessary, they also agreed that changing the daily practices and decisions made 
at the local level — by police, prosecutors, judges, and parole and probation officers — are imperative 
to reduce racial disparities. Such changes can be implemented without waiting for legislatures to act. 
Participants also agreed that a systemic over-reliance on jails contributes to the underlying causes that 
create racial disparities. Accordingly, the recommendations set forth in this report, drawn from the 
Roundtable discussion, focus both on reducing jail usage and on changing local practices. They include: 
•	 Limiting	the	use	of	pretrial	detention	to	individuals	who	pose	a	threat	to	public	safety;
•	 Increasing	 diversion	 programs	 for	 low-level	 offenses	 at	 the	 arrest,	 pre-charge,	 and	 pretrial	
phases to reduce the number of people entering jails;
•	 Setting	specific	goals	 to	reduce	racial	disparities,	 including	 incentives	 to	steer	decisions	and	
success measures to track progress;
•	 Creating	 cross-departmental	 task	 forces	 to	 identify	 drivers	 of	 racial	 disparities	 and	 devise	
strategies to address them; 
•	 Requiring	training	to	reduce	implicit	racial	bias	for	all	justice	system	actors	—	including	police,	
judges, prosecutors, probation officers, parole board members, correctional officers, and court 
administrators; 
•	 Encouraging	prosecutors	to	prioritize	serious	and	violent	offenses;
•	 Increasing	public	defense	representation	for	misdemeanor	offenses;	
•	 Developing	checklists	(referred	to	as	“bench	cards”)	for	judges	to	use	in	hearings	to	combat	
implicit biases in decision making and encourage alternatives to incarceration. 
Each of these concrete recommendations can help decrease disparities. Implemented together, they 
can work to reduce disparities and unnecessary incarceration across the justice system. 
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RACIAL DISPARITIES: A LOCAL LOOK
Millions of people come into contact with local justice systems and spend time in America’s jails. On 
any given day, approximately 740,000 Americans are in jails. Over the course of a year, 11.4 million are 
admitted to the country’s 3,283 jails.6 
Local jail systems, like prisons, have expanded since the 1980s and 1990s. The number of people 
entering local jails has nearly doubled. And those who enter jails are more likely to stay there for longer. 
In 1983, the average jail stay was 14 days. By 2013, it was 23 days.7 
Today, counties spend millions to house this expanded jail population. New York City, with over 
12,200 daily jail inmates, spends $460 per day per person — costing taxpayers more than $5.6 million 
per day. Los Angeles County spends $129 per day per inmate to house an average of 17,400 inmates 
— at a daily cost of $2.2 million.8 
This section provides a summary of who is held in our jails. It then discusses the drivers of racial 
disparities in jails as identified by Roundtable participants and the opportunity for reform. 
I.
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What are “racial and ethnic disparities”?
Racial and ethnic disparities refer to instances where a person experiences differential treatment or 
outcomes based on his or her race or ethnic background. 
Examples abound:
 
•	 Almost	one	in	three	people	arrested	for	drug	law	violations	are	African	American,	even	
though drug use rates do not differ significantly by race or ethnicity.1 Though drug laws 
are racially neutral, they are enforced in a way that disproportionately affects minorities. 
 
•	 Nationally,	police	stop	African	American	drivers	for	traffic	reasons	slightly	more	often	than	
whites and Hispanics. A closer look at state and local data demonstrate that police are 
significantly more likely to search, question, and arrest African Americans and Hispanics once 
stopped.2 A recent report from the Sentencing Project concluded, “[o]nce pulled over, African 
American and Hispanic drivers were three times as likely as whites to be searched and blacks 
were twice as likely as whites to be arrested during a traffic stop.”3 
•	 Another	 study	 of	 misdemeanor	 arrest	 rates	 in	 New	 York	 City	 indicated	 that	 African	
Americans were more than five times more likely to be arrested as whites, and Hispanics 
were four times more likely to be arrested.4
Roundtable participants discussed these disturbing trends extensively. As one local government 
participant explained, “When you look at a particular decision point, you see similarly situated people 
treated differently. It may be unfair. It may be biased. There may be various reasons for these disparities. 
The challenge for a jurisdiction is to go beneath the percentages and proportions to dig down to the 
decision points where actual disparate treatment is taking place. We need to change decision making at 
those points.” 
Throughout this report, we refer to “racial disparities” as shorthand to encompass both racial and 
ethnic disparities.5 While research indicates that troubling disparities exist for other minority 
groups, particularly Native Americans, this report does not focus on these populations due to the 
limited data available. 
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A. Who is in Local Jails and Why? 
The United States incarcerates 2.3 million people. This includes people held in two different types of 
facilities: prisons and jails. 
Prisons hold people convicted of state or federal crimes, serving long term sentences. They are operated 
in a unified manner by a state or the federal government. Jails, on the other hand, are run by cities, 
counties, or other local entities. They house higher volumes of people for shorter terms. People in jail 
are either: detained while awaiting trial, convicted and awaiting transfer to prison, convicted of low-
level crimes with short sentences, or incarcerated for violations of parole or probation. Some jails house 
immigration detainees.9 Jails are not centrally managed. They operate independently and vary in practice 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. On any given day there are approximately 740,000 people in jails. 
Entry Points to Jail
People reach jail in a variety of ways: 
•	 Jail Booking: Once an officer arrests someone, the officer must make a record of that arrest 
(i.e. “book” the person). An officer takes the suspect to a local jail and places the individual 
behind bars until the officer makes a full record of the arrest, including taking fingerprints, 
collecting personal information, and documenting details of the alleged crime. Whether 
someone arrested is admitted to jail — or simply cited and released — is a policy decision 
made by each jurisdiction. A report from the Vera Institute of Justice suggests that police 
are more likely to jail a suspect after arrest today than in the 1980s or 1990s.10 
•	 Pretrial Detention: If a prosecutor chooses to file charges based on an arrest, a person must 
wait for trial. While waiting, a defendant can be released, given the opportunity to pay bail 
(or be held if they cannot pay), or detained without bail. “Pretrial detention” is the practice 
of incarcerating a defendant pending trial. Currently, 63 percent of those in jails are pretrial 
detainees, accused of either misdemeanor or felony crimes.11 
•	 Misdemeanor Convictions: Misdemeanors are low-level criminal offenses that typically 
carry a maximum sentence of less than a year in jail. These include nonviolent, traffic, 
property, drug, or public order offenses. About 80 percent of state court dockets involve 
misdemeanor prosecutions.12 Nearly 75 percent of people in jails are there for misdemeanor 
crimes — either awaiting trial or convicted.13 
•	 Probation and Parole Violations: When someone violates the conditions of their parole or 
probation, they are often held in jail for at least a short period of time. Probation typically 
refers to a court-imposed sentence which a person serves under supervision in the community, 
instead of behind bars. Parole typically refers to early release before the completion of a 
sentence, and is usually granted for good behavior in prison. Both parole and probation 
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Source:  U.S. Census Bureau, Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.19
Figure 1: General Population and Jail Demographics
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Other
involve strict conditions of supervision. If a person violates these conditions — which may 
range from failing a drug test to committing a new crime — he is usually sent to jail until a 
hearing occurs. Sometimes, he may serve the remainder of the sentence in jail, or he may be 
sent back to prison.14 The rates at which people on probation and parole are re-incarcerated 
vary by jurisdiction. For example, New York City’s probation revocation rate is 20 percent, 
while revocation rates in Madison and Seneca counties approach 60 percent.15 
•	 Transfers: Jails sometimes hold people temporarily while they await transfer to another 
facility. These facilities include: juveniles detention centers, mental health facilities, hospitals, 
or prison. Jails may also hold federal or state inmates when prisons are overcrowded.16
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African Americans and Hispanics are significantly overrepresented in jails. While together these groups 
represent 30 percent of the general population, they account for 51 percent of the jail population. In 
particular, African Americans are jailed at almost four times the rate of whites.17 Notably, national data 
suggests that Hispanics are not disproportionately represented in jails. However, much research indicates 
that Hispanics likely are, in fact, overrepresented in jails, but due to inaccurate and inconsistent data 
collection, this trend is not captured in national data.18 
Why do these disparities exist and how are they created? 
From police stops to arrests to prosecution to probation and parole revocation, people of color frequently 
experience harsher outcomes that lead to detention. At each of these decision points, various local 
criminal justice actors exercise discretion that can lead to a person of color going to jail when a similarly 
situated white person may not. Those collective decisions produce the racial and ethnic disparities 
reflected in our jails. They can include:
•	 Stops and Arrests: When police are confronted with possible criminal activity, they must decide what 
action to take. They can decide to do nothing, issue a summons or verbal warning, direct the person 
to social services or treatment, make an arrest, or take some other action. 
•	 Charging: Once a person has been arrested, prosecutors must decide whether to bring formal 
criminal charges. If prosecutors accept a case, they exercise great discretion in what charges to file. 
•	 Pretrial Detention: Once arrested, a person can be detained pretrial. Judges, bail commissioners, 
prosecutors, and sometimes police exercise discretion in whether to hold someone in jail or 
release them until the case ends. 
•	 Short-term Sentences: Once a person is convicted of a crime — whether through a guilty plea or, 
less commonly, a trial — a judge exercises discretion to decide the type and length of punishment 
within the broad ranges set by local ordinance or statute. Prosecutors also have wide discretion in 
recommending sentences. Most criminal sentences of less than a year are served in jails.  
•	 Probation and Parole Revocations: Judges, parole boards, probation departments, and 
correctional officers have discretion in establishing conditions when people are placed on 
probation or parole. They also exercise discretion in enforcing those conditions. A judge can 
decide to revoke supervision for violations. Many offenders serve time in jails, not prison, 
when their parole or probation is revoked. 
This report recommends ways to reduce racial and ethnic disparities by changing decision making. As 
shorthand, this report refers to racial disparities “in jails” to refer to all these decision points. 
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A few additional trends relating to jails: 
•	 Lack of Treatment: Jails now serve as de facto mental health treatment centers. The most recent 
research shows that almost two-thirds (64 percent) of jail inmates had mental health problem 
and almost the same percent (68 percent) suffered from substance abuse problems.20 Today, sixty 
percent of inmates admitted to Chicago’s Cook County jail are diagnosed with a mental illness. 
Forty percent of inmates in New York City’s Riker’s Island jail have a mental illness, nearly doubling 
since 2006.21 Inmates with mental illnesses stay in jail longer, too. In Orange County, Fla., jail 
inmates generally stay an average of 26 days, whereas mentally ill inmates stay 51 days. In New 
York’s Rikers Island jail, the average stay for all inmates is 42 days; mentally ill inmates, however, 
stay on average 215 days.22 
•	 Increased Likelihood of Recidivism and Prison: Exposure to jails can prolong an individual’s 
entanglement in the justice system more broadly. Research has found that pretrial detention in local 
jails for even two-three days increases the likelihood that a defendant will commit a new crime upon 
release.23 Jail stays also increase the likelihood that defendants will be sentenced to incarceration after 
conviction, and that they will receive a harsher sentence. This may occur due to the destabilizing 
experience of being jailed, including loss of employment, loss of income, exposure to disease, and 
increased opportunity for association with people prone to criminal behavior.24 As one Roundtable 
participant, a local prosecutor, observed, “The criminal justice system is the only public service that 
makes people worse off.” 
•	 Increased Fiscal Costs: Today, local governments spend $22.2 billion on jails — four times more than 
in 1983. The Vera Institute’s 2015 study found that this cost is driven by larger jail populations, 
which require larger correctional staff and other costs to run facilities.25 
Figure 2: Risk of Recidivism & Pretrial Detention
Source: Lowenkamp, VanNostrand, and Holsinger (2013).26
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Figure 3: Mental Health and Length of Stay 
Source: Treatment Advocacy Center.27
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B. Contributors to Racial Disparities in Jails
The Roundtable participants discussed five major factors they believed contribute to the racial and 
ethnic disparities reflected in the jail population. 
1. Focus on Low-Level Offenses 
Police patrol the streets, engage with community residents, and investigate and respond to criminal 
activity. Often, their response culminates in an arrest. In 2013 alone, police arrested more than 11 
million people.28 Seventy percent of these arrests are for low-level offenses, such as drug abuse violations, 
driving under the influence, disorderly contact, and drunkenness.29  
While data shows that African Americans and Hispanics do commit certain crimes at higher rates 
than whites, this does not account for the outsize representation of racial minorities in arrests overall. 
Roundtable participants offered a sampling of reasons for this disparity in arrests, including:
•	 Increased	Likelihood	 of	Being	 Stopped: A 2013 federal district court found that 83 percent of 
those stopped by the New York City Police Department were African American or Hispanic, 
even though these two groups were just 52 percent of the city’s population.30 Data presented in 
a federal district court in a Philadelphia case revealed that, of the more than 253,000 pedestrians 
stopped in 2009, more than 70 percent were African American or Hispanic.31 At the Roundtable, 
a civil rights advocate provided this perspective: “Race plays out in excessive stops. In urban 
America, Hispanics get stopped, detained, and questioned at rates that far surpass whites — 
not nearly as far as blacks, but definitely far surpass whites. In parts of the country where the 
suspicion of illegal presence is a predicate for the stop, it exacerbates this disparity.”
•	 Increased Likelihood of Arrest: Evidence demonstrates that once stopped by a police officer, 
African Americans are arrested at a higher rate than other racial groups. A recent study of 3,528 
police departments found that blacks are more likely to be arrested in almost every city for 
almost every type of crime. At least 70 police departments arrested black people at a rate ten 
times higher than non-black people. In a suburb of Dearborn, Mich., the disparity in arrest 
rates for blacks was a staggering 26 times the rate for other races.32 
•	 Increased Likelihood of Drug Arrests: African Americans are almost four times more likely to 
be arrested for selling drugs and more than twice as likely to be arrested for possessing drugs, 
even though whites are more likely to sell drugs and equally likely to consume them.33 African 
Americans constitute 30 percent of arrests for drug violation offenses even though they make 
up only 13 percent of the total population.34 One participant put it this way: “A white and 
black defendant — whether a drug offender, drug user, or drug peddler — receives obviously 
different treatment in the criminal justice system.”
•	 Increased Likelihood of Traffic Citations: A 2012 study of Washington state police practices 
demonstrates that while minorities and whites are stopped at the same rate for driving violations, 
African Americans and Hispanics are more likely to receive citations. For each stop, whites 
18  |  BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE
received on average 1.74 citations, while African Americans received 1.94 and Hispanics received 
1.98.35 A 2012 report for the state of Minnesota indicated that African Americans were 20 times 
more likely to be stopped for a traffic offense than whites.36 These violations include such things as 
driving without insurance or driving on a suspended license.37 Said one participant, “To address 
racial disparities, we need to think about how we use the traffic code to pull over motorists. So 
many consequences flow from the ability of the police to stop a car for a traffic infraction. Many 
people’s first contact with the justice system is based on a broken taillight or an expired license 
plate. Cities and counties may want to consider curbing minor traffic infraction stops.”
Roundtable participants discussed how police practices influence other decisions in the local justice 
system to increase racial disparities. A law enforcement leader observed, “Police are the first contact 
point — they usually make the first decisions about who gets pulled into the criminal justice system.” 
A member of the judiciary noted, “The numbers of misdemeanor and drug cases in our courts are 
driven by police practices. Often disparate policing practices end up producing more low-level cases in 
our courts particularly against minority defendants.” Several participants confirmed this point, noting 
that disparate enforcement results in disparate outcomes. An advocate explained as follows: “Reducing 
the jail population requires understanding the reality that communities face selective enforcement on 
a daily basis. You can change how the system reacts, but that’s not going to stop the faucet. The faucet 
here is the large number of people of color entering the system through arrests.” 
Today, arrests are more likely to lead to punishment and jail time for defendants than in previous decades. 
A 2014 study by the National Bureau of Economic Research identified more punitive treatment after arrest 
as a driver of incarceration nationally.38 As the Vera Institute recently noted, “[t]he likelihood that arrest will 
lead to a jail booking has increased steadily” in the last 30 years.39 Racial disparities in arrests exacerbate racial 
disparities in incarceration.40 A participant in law enforcement explained this sentiment, noting, “Once an 
arrest is made, it’s like turning on an engine that only knows how to do one thing: incarcerate.”
Research also demonstrates that minorities tend to be punished more severely than white counterparts 
for the low-level, misdemeanor drug and property offenses that lead to jail sentences.41 For example: 
•	 A	2014	Vera	 Institute	 study	of	New	York	County	 found	 that	30	percent	of	African	American	
defendants were sentenced to jail for misdemeanor offenses, compared to 20 percent of Hispanic 
defendants and 16 percent of white defendants. African Americans were 89 percent more likely 
to be jailed for misdemeanor “person offenses” (such as assault) and 85 percent more likely to be 
incarcerated for misdemeanor drug offenses compared to white defendants. Hispanic defendants 
were 32 percent more likely to be incarcerated for misdemeanor person offenses.42 
•	 A	2003	study	of	misdemeanor	sentences	in	five	Nebraska	counties	found	that	non-white	defendants	
were sentenced to fines more than 40 percent higher than those imposed on white defendants for 
similar offenses. However, the study found that white defendants received 20 percent higher fines 
than non-white counterparts when charged with more serious misdemeanor offenses.43 
REDUCING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN JAILS  |  19
Roundtable participants spoke frequently about the increased probability that low-level arrests result in 
jail time for minorities. As one participant explained, “Misdemeanor convictions, not felony cases, really 
create the volume of jail inmates. They add up. Incarceration in our jails is mostly for low-level offenses 
— which can actually be dealt with in better ways.” Another explained, “We need to look at the entire 
process of what happens in misdemeanor courts. Most defendants don’t have lawyers, and most cases 
result in guilty pleas. To reduce disparities, we need to first look at the outcomes in misdemeanor cases.” 
An advocate added: “We need to look at alternative sentences for misdemeanors other than jail time. 
We really need to look at the top five drivers of county jails populations. These are crimes like public 
intoxication, driving with a suspended license, or not paying child support. We need to look at why we are 
incarcerating such a high volume of people for these crimes, and how we can safely change that.” 
2. unnecessary use of Pretrial Detention
Once a person has been arrested, he or she may be held in jail while criminal charges are resolved. Most often, 
a judge, magistrate, or bail commissioner will decide whether or not to release a defendant before charges 
are resolved. There are three options at these hearings: release on bail, release without bail (commonly called 
“released on own recognizance”), or hold pretrial in jail. The decision is determined by a number of factors, 
including whether the person is a threat to public safety and the likelihood of appearing in court.  
In most jurisdictions, setting a monetary bail amount is used as a proxy for this analysis. Money bail is 
intended to ensure that the person will show up to court appearances and will not engage in criminal 
activity. Nationally, 61 percent of defendants were required to post financial bail for their release.44 
Between 1992 and 2006, the use of money bail increased by 32 percent,45 and the average bail amount 
increased by more than $30,000.46
Unnecessarily detaining defendants in jail before trial has a significant negative impact on the defendant, 
and often on public safety, including: 
•	 Harsher Punishment: Research found that defendants detained for the entire period before trial 
were more than four times more likely to be sentenced to jail and more than three times more 
likely to be sentenced to prison compared to released defendants. Defendants jailed before 
trial also received jail sentences three times longer and prison sentences twice as long as those 
released.47 Those detained before trial are also more likely to plead guilty.48
•	 Increased Likelihood of Recidivism: Even short periods of pretrial detention for low-risk defendants 
can compromise public safety. Low-risk defendants are defined as “individuals who can be released 
with little or no supervisory conditions with reasonable assurances that they will appear in court 
and will not threaten community safety.”49 A 2013 study — which examined 153,000 defendants 
jailed in Kentucky between 2009 and 2010 — found that low-risk defendants held for two-three 
days were almost 40 percent more likely to commit new crimes before trial compared to defendants 
released within 24 hours. When held for 8-14 days, defendants were 51 percent more likely to 
commit another crime compared to defendants released within 24 hours.50 
•	 Socio-economic Consequences: Studies have shown that jail detention between arrest and dismissal 
or conviction can lead to the loss of employment, housing, or even medical coverage.51 
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Research confirms that racial disparities exist in the use of pretrial detention. For example: 
•	 A	2012	study	found	that	African	American	and	Hispanic	defendants	were	more	likely	to	be	detained	
pending trial, less likely to be able to afford their bail (which was assessed at higher amounts), and 
less likely to be granted release in comparison to similarly situated white defendants.52 
•	 A	2013	study	by	the	Vera	Institute	found	race	and	ethnicity	a	predictive	factor	in	determining	
whether defendants were detained or released at arraignment. These disparities were most 
extreme for misdemeanor offenses, where African Americans were 20 percent more likely than 
whites to be detained before trial.53 
•	 A	study	for	the	Bureau	of	Justice	Statistics	concluded	that	African	American	defendants	were	66	
percent more likely to be detained before trial and Hispanic defendants 91 percent more likely to 
be detained, in comparison to white defendants. Hispanics were also 39 percent more likely to be 
charged a bail amount in exchange for pretrial release — and were required to pay higher amounts.54 
Roundtable participants recognized that reducing reliance on pretrial detention can reduce racial disparities 
in local jails. Said one participant, “The impact of reducing pretrial detention is twofold: It reduces the 
number of people detained and it dramatically reduces the number of people of color detained since they 
typically constitute a very large portion of the detention population.” To the extent that pretrial detention 
hinges on an individual’s ability to pay bail — as opposed to assessing his or her threat to public safety 
— the brunt will be felt by poor people of color. A leading scholar on race and pretrial justice explained, 
“Thousands and thousands of people are in jail for relatively minor offenses solely because they cannot pay 
a fairly nominal bail amount.” Another participant in pretrial justice echoed the concern: “Communities 
of color are usually also the most economically depressed. So money — or lack thereof — plays a major 
role in creating racial disparities in our money-based pretrial system.” 
3. Expansion in Parole and Probation 
Over the past 30 years, the number of people held on parole or probation (referred to as “community 
supervision”) more than doubled.55 The United States places individuals on probation and parole at a 
far higher rate than other democratic countries.56 Today, about 1 in 51 adults — or 4.8 million people 
— are on probation or parole, far exceeding the number of people incarcerated in the country.57
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Figure 4: Correctional Populations in the united States (1985-2013)
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics.58 
There are often many conditions placed upon individuals under supervision — some genuinely related 
to public safety and others not. Some are difficult to comply with, particularly for defendants living in 
poor urban centers or those battling substance abuse. Conditions may include: work or school attendance; 
medical or psychiatric treatment; payment of child support, court costs, or other fees; periodic reporting 
to an officer; remaining in the court’s jurisdiction; or house arrest or electronic monitoring.59 While some 
conditions are necessary, other conditions can become overly burdensome to certain individuals, and may 
undermine successful reintegration into society. For example, requiring someone to pay fees when they do 
not have a job creates a situation where the person cannot meet their supervision conditions and is likely 
to violate them. Parole and probation officers and judges have discretion in how to respond to violations of 
conditions. Violation of conditions often results in revocation to jail or prison.60  
Data also reflect racial disparities in responses to probation and parole violations: 
•	 A	2009	study	conducted	by	the	National	Council	on	Crime	&	Delinquency	found	that	African	
Americans are seven times more likely to be sent back to prison for parole violations and 
four times more likely to be sent to prison for probation violations in comparison to whites. 
Hispanics were almost three times as likely to be sent back to prison for parole violations.61 
•	 In	2014,	an	Urban	Institute	study	of	four	counties	found	African	Americans	had	their	probation	
revoked at higher rates than both white and Hispanic probationers. In Dallas County, Texas, 
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African American probationers were revoked to prison at a rate 55 percent higher than white 
probationers. In Multnomah County, Ore., the level of revocation was more than twice as high.62
Roundtable participants repeatedly asserted that increases in the number of people on parole and 
probation contributes to the growth of local justice systems. A participant who was formerly incarcerated 
stated: “We’re trying to shrink the beast, right?  In order to shrink jails, we should shrink the number 
of people on parole and probation, too. Those people easily find themselves in jail simply for failure 
to comply with the really restrictive conditions imposed on them.” A prosecutor agreed: “Particularly 
for misdemeanors, research shows that over-supervising people — getting overly involved in their lives 
— actually increases the likelihood of recidivism. Misdemeanants tend to have jobs. They are often 
law abiding people who made a mistake that caught the attention of the police. Once you kick the 
juggernaut of the criminal justice system into action for a misdemeanor, you are likely to get worse 
outcomes. We need to be more careful about who we place on parole and probation, and when we send 
them to jail for violations.” 
4. Perverse Incentives that Increase Incarceration 
In part, the criminal justice system has expanded due to perverse financial incentives to increase arrests, 
seizures, pretrial detentions, convictions, prison sentences, and revocations back to jail or prison. As one 
participant put it, “Expansion of the criminal justice system is partially a matter of economics. If you follow 
the financial incentives of the system, you can see exactly why and how it’s expanded so dramatically.”
In response to a crime epidemic in the 1970s and 1980s, policymakers implemented changes that led 
to an explosion in the number of people entering the criminal justice system.63 With this growth came 
a flood in government spending. As explained in several recent Brennan Center reports, too often, the 
measurement for success in reducing crime became volume-dependent, focusing on the number of 
arrests, convictions, or prisoners.64 States devised severe sentencing regimes, enticed in part by federal 
funding for prisons and other financial supplements. Government funding created incentives to pull 
more people into the pipeline toward incarceration, sometimes directly and sometimes inadvertently. 
These financial incentives help shape criminal justice policy and increase the size of the system. Here are 
some examples of how they can play out at the local level: 
 
•	 Volume-Based Performance Measures: The Justice Department’s March 2015 report on practices 
in Ferguson, Mo., highlights the impact of performance measures. The Ferguson Police 
Department measured its performance based on revenue collected through enforcement 
tactics. As the Justice Department reported, “Where [Ferguson Police Department] officers 
fail to meet productivity goals [of making arrests and issuing citations], supervisors have 
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been instructed to alter officer assignments or impose discipline.” Similarly, performance 
evaluations heavily emphasized “productivity,” with one specific evaluation measure as “[i]
ncrease/consistent in productivity, the ability to maintain an average ticket [amount] of 28 
per month.” As the report concludes, “the City goes so far as to direct [the Ferguson Police 
Department] to develop enforcement strategies and initiatives, not to better protect the public, 
but to raise more revenue.”65 These and other types of volume-based performance measures are 
common throughout the criminal justice system. They incentivize a larger system — including 
more arrests and more people in jail — without necessarily promoting public safety.
•	 Cost-shifting between Agencies: Probation officers are often granted the authority to initiate 
proceedings to revoke a defendant to prison or jail for failure to comply with supervision 
conditions.66 Notably, counties and cities pay for the cost of probation, but the state pays 
for the cost of incarceration in prison. When probation officers, who generally work for the 
county, revoke probationers to prison, they do not need to consider the fiscal costs of that 
decision.67 Most of these revocations result in jail time.68 
•	 Pressure to Generate Revenue: Law enforcement agencies often generate revenue for their budgets 
by seizing the property of individuals suspected of criminal activity. In a survey of nearly 800 
law enforcement agencies, nearly 40 percent reported that seizing the property of criminal 
suspects (a practice called civil asset forfeiture) was a “necessary” budget supplement.69 A 2010 
report found that asset forfeiture accounted for more than 14 percent of police budgets in 
Texas, with rural jurisdictions averaging 18 percent.70 Making police budgets dependent in 
any way on seizing the property of suspects creates clear incentives to increase seizures — even 
if there is little public safety value in doing so. Along with increased seizures, usually comes 
an increase in arrests, charges, and pretrial detention. A 2007 study found that a one percent 
increase in forfeiture proceeds correlates with a .66 percent increase in the drug arrest rate.71 
Conservatives, progressives, and some law enforcement officials have noted the problematic 
nature of this type of revenue generation.72
Many participants — from prosecutors to defense attorneys — referenced the performance measures 
used to assess “success” of local agencies, and their potential to create perverse incentives. As a member 
of the defense bar explained, “An important question in this conversation is: What are the metrics of 
success in our justice system? If we fund agencies based on the number of cases they prosecute, the 
number of people they arrest or the number of clients they defend — and then punish them when 
those numbers go down by taking away resources — we perpetuate our problems. Then the system 
grows without a purpose.” Another participant, a prosecutor, put it this way: “We need to start thinking 
about what those metrics should be for each stage of the process. What should the metric be for good 
policing? What should the metric be for good prosecution? For good probation? We should create the 
financial incentives — the performance measures, the revenue generation, the costs — based on those 
goals.” One participant summed it up: “Money is a ‘stakeholder’ in the justice system. It contributes to 
the expansion of the system, including our jail population.” 
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5. Aggressive Collection of Criminal Justice Debt 
Criminal defendants are frequently required to pay various expenses at different stages of their processing 
through the system. Unlike punitive fines or restitution to compensate the victims of crimes, these “user fees” 
are imposed solely to raise revenue. Cash-strapped states and local jurisdictions are increasingly imposing fees 
at every point in the system — from fees for public defender services to parole supervision charges. 
Fees are often imposed without considering a defendant’s ability to pay.73 If a defendant cannot pay 
the fees immediately, they multiply. Many states charge extra fees for entering into payment plans 
and impose unreasonable interest rates for such plans.74 Coupled with aggressive collection practices 
— ranging from driver’s license suspensions to wage garnishments to arrest and re-incarceration — 
criminal justice debt can prolong entanglement with the criminal justice system even after a defendant 
has served his or her sentence.75 This prevents their reintegration into law-abiding society. 
Though the Supreme Court prohibited incarceration as a penalty for those too poor to pay court fees and 
fines, states still use aggressive debt collection practices that result in incarceration for nonpayment.76 
A 2010 Brennan Center study found that in the 15 states with the largest prison populations, re-
incarcerating individuals for failing to pay debts is common. In all 15 states, payment of criminal justice 
debt was a condition of probation or parole. At least 11 states authorized incarceration for failing to pay 
criminal justice debt. Two states offered defendants the opportunity to “choose” jail as an alternative 
to paying debts. Additionally, counties in all 15 states arrested people for failing to pay criminal justice 
debt or appearing at debt-related hearings. These arrests led to jail stays.77 More recently, the Justice 
Department report on Ferguson, Mo.’s criminal justice system identified the same problem, finding: 
“The municipal court routinely issued warrants for people to be arrested and incarcerated for failing to 
timely pay related fees and fines.”78 
Increased fees lead to an increased likelihood of returning to jail if unable to pay. Data, though limited, 
suggest that these fees are disproportionately imposed on racial and ethnic minorities: 
•	 A	2004	Washington	state	study	found	that	Hispanics	generally	received	4.8	percent	higher	fees	
for felony convictions compared to whites convicted of similar offenses.79 
•	 A	Philadelphia	study	conducted	between	1994	and	2000	found	that	user	fees	were	significantly	
more likely to be imposed on African Americans, though whites received more punitive fines 
(such as restitution).80 
•	 An	Illinois	study	found	that,	while	white	probationers	received	a	higher	number	of	separate	
fees, the size of the fees levied on minorities were larger by comparison.81 
Criminal justice debt was discussed briefly at the Roundtable. As one participant stated, “Once people 
enter the justice system, money — or the lack of it — directly affects whether they enter jail. In reality, 98 
percent of people who come through our system cannot afford $50. Even though some fees seem nominal 
in theory, they are costly in application for people making minimum wage or below, and those living in 
poverty.” A conservative advocate agreed on the topic of fines, saying, “People should not be incarcerated 
REDUCING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN JAILS  |  25
simply for being poor.” He pointed to this pattern in relation to outstanding warrants, specifically: “We 
ought to figure out a better way to address outstanding warrants than just sending people to jail. In 
Ferguson, each house had at least three warrants on average that led to jail stays. That seems excessive.” 
Participants discussed at length the role of socioeconomic inequality in perpetuating racial disparities. 
As one participant explained, “I think much of the overreliance on incarceration today is related to 
increasing socioeconomic inequality in American society. For those left out of the growing middle 
class in the 1970s and 1980s, changes in the economy and society made their situations worse. That 
contributed to communities experiencing social disorder of various kinds — including increased 
crime and incarceration.” An academic noted, “Racial disparities are undergirded by socioeconomic 
inequality. These two factors mutually reinforce each other. In Washington state, data demonstrates no 
racial disparity when it comes to who police stop. But there is significant disparity in how many tickets 
police issue once they stop people. This affects who ends up in jail for not paying tickets. These are 
important intersections of race and class that need to be addressed.” 
C. The Role of Implicit Bias
Racial disparities are not always the product of intentional biases. They are frequently the result of 
unconscious and unintentional biases that everyone — African American, white, Hispanic or other — 
learns and maintains culturally. 
“Implicit bias” refers to the mental attitudes or stereotypes toward a person or group that unconsciously 
affect a person’s thoughts, actions, and decisions.82 This concept is grounded in sociological and 
psychological research demonstrating that human “thoughts, feelings, and actions are shaped by factors 
largely outside of our conscious awareness, control or intention.”83 This dynamic is particularly strong 
with regard to racial perceptions in the criminal justice system. Stanford Prof. Jennifer Eberhardt’s 
groundbreaking research demonstrates that white men shown a fleeting image of a black male face were 
able to recognize the outline of a gun in subsequent photos more quickly than those people shown 
images of a white male face. The study implies an association with race and crime that Eberhardt argues 
can unintentionally infect decision makers in the criminal justice system.84 A recent criminology study 
suggested that implicit bias could lead a police officer to “automatically perceive crime in the making” 
when seeing two young Hispanic males driving in an all-Caucasian neighborhood.85Another study 
assessing cognitive bias, found that 87 percent of judges more quickly associated white with “good” and 
black with “bad,” suggesting a preference toward white defendants that could play out in the courtroom.86 
Roundtable participants repeatedly emphasized how implicit bias contributes to racial disparities. They 
all agreed that implicit bias needs to be addressed head-on to help reduce disparities in treatment.  A 
law enforcement representative explained, “We need to have conversations about implicit bias and how 
to break through these biases. We need to self-reflect and understand that — as a police officer, chief, 
policymaker, or judge — we carry these biases with us and they affect our decisions. The challenge is 
that actors often feel attacked when we talk about racial disparities. They think we are accusing them of 
being racist. But more often than not, these biases are unconscious. If we can engage law enforcement 
in particular to understand these biases, they can become a solution to the problem.” An advocate 
agreed, “It’s no secret that our system treats people of color and whites differently. Communities of 
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color, especially Latino communities, want answers for why this is happening because they are losing 
faith in the legitimacy of the justice system. We need to collectively understand why these disparities 
are occurring and how to prevent them.” 
As another participant explained, “Sometimes when we are silent about race in our communications, 
subconscious fears and stereotypes win the day. If we don’t address implicit bias directly in conversations 
about reform, it will impede progress toward improving any aspect of the justice system, not just 
the racial equity component.” A local judge added, “When my jurisdiction decided to confront the 
influence of race or ethnicity in outcomes, we said it. It’s critical that we try to prevent the influence of 
unconscious bias in our justice system.” 
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RECOMMENDATIONS TO DECREASE INCARCERATION AND RACIAL DISPARITIES 
IN JAILS
This section proposes reforms to change local practices and policies that lead to the racial and ethnic 
disparities reflected in jails. These recommendations provide a sampling of the most powerful ideas 
expressed by Roundtable experts. 
Participants emphasized that, to fully reduce racial disparities, jurisdictions must also focus on reducing 
their overreliance on jail detention. As one participant explained, “The easiest way to reduce disparities 
is just to arrest more white people, but obviously that does not further justice. It’s a fair assumption 
that if we reduce the size of the system and figure out ways to keep people out of it, we will improve 
the disparity problem.” Many agreed. One advocate, however, noted that cutting jail populations alone 
may not reduce racial disparities: “We would reduce the jail population by diverting some people out 
but the disparities in the system may remain if we don’t have a clear focus on reducing racial disparities.” 
A scholar agreed, stating, “I understand that a rising tide lifts all boats and that African Americans and 
Hispanics may disproportionately benefit from a reduction in jail use, but it is hard to ensure racially 
just outcomes through color blind mechanisms.” A director of a local correctional facility provided a 
real world example, explaining, “In the jurisdiction that I am from, the level of imprisonment is down 
by 26 percent, and very clearly the number of minorities incarcerated is down too. But the percentage 
of the population has not changed.” 
Overall, participants agreed that both goals — a reduction in jail populations and a reduction in 
racial disparities — must be sought. While reforms to state and federal law are valuable and needed 
to meet these goals, participants focused on local policies and practices that could change without 
legislative interventions. These recommendations seek to provide solutions at each step of the justice 
system leading to jail — including arrests, pretrial detentions, prosecutions, court decisions, parole and 
probation revocations, and other key decisions — that will reduce racial disparities and jail populations. 
1. Reduce Reliance on Pretrial Detention 
Roundtable participants universally agreed that reducing pretrial detention is essential to reducing 
racial disparities. A recent report from the Vera Institute found that the average length of stay in jails 
increased from 14 days in 1983 to 23 days in 2013. The report concluded that “it is highly likely that 
the increase in the average length of stay is largely driven by longer stays in jails by people who are 
unconvicted of any crime.”87 In other words, the practice of detaining defendants waiting for trial is a 
major contributor to jail populations.
A criminal justice policy expert at the Roundtable noted, “The amount of people we detain before trial 
drives up the jail population. Many of these people don’t need to be held in jail while waiting for trial. 
Many are unlikely to commit new crimes and could be safely released.” Participants emphasized that jail 
should prioritize housing dangerous defendants. They identified two specific interventions.
II.
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Introduce Pretrial Risk Assessment Tools 
Participants recommended jurisdictions adopt validated risk assessment instruments (“RAIs”). RAIs 
measure the risk that a person will reoffend if and when released and identify needed treatments and 
intervention to reduce that risk. RAIs weigh a number of factors, usually including “static factors” 
(which cannot change, such as criminal history, age, and race) and certain “dynamic factors” (which can 
change, such as drug dependence, mental health, associating with antisocial peers, and employment).88 
A RAI is considered validated and acceptable for use when it is shown, through rigorous research and 
testing, to accurately predict risks and does not show biases toward defendants based on race, ethnicity, 
gender, or financial status.89 When used pretrial, an RAI predicts the likelihood that a defendant may 
fail to appear for court hearings or be arrested on a new charge prior to the completion of their case.90 
Roundtable participants discussed RAIs’ effectiveness in reducing racial disparities. A law enforcement 
representative explained, “All jurisdictions should start using risk assessment tools so that they make 
pretrial decisions based on threat to public safety, not bias or guesses.” However, a criminal justice 
reform advocate noted, “We are really concerned that risk assessments may disproportionately benefit 
white defendants. Considering things like prior arrests can create disparities when people of color tend 
to live in neighborhoods with more police patrolling them, which leads to more contact with police and 
more arrests for low-level offenses. But the alternative to a risk assessment is a judge’s gut feeling. That 
may be worse.” An advocate provided additional detail: “Risk assessment tools would guide judges’ 
discretion. Data from some California jurisdictions does show that these tools reduce racial disparity 
even though race is baked into factors like a prior record and employment. The key is to reduce or 
eliminate elements of the tools that produce disparities, and then put them to use.” 
Many participants stressed the value of risk assessment tools: They center pretrial decisions on threats 
to public safety and flight risk, whereas the current system, with its focus on a defendant’s ability to pay 
money bail, does not. One participant noted, “In the current bail system, we have a lot of discretion 
with no accountability. The bail official, who may or may not even be a lawyer, decides to release the 
defendant or sets a bail amount. Sometimes decisions are made on a predetermined schedule, but 
usually they are set by practice. No one is looking to see if there is a real basis for the bail amount. No 
one is looking to see whether the decision is tied to flight risk or community safety. We need a system 
that requires actors to justify their discretionary decisions.” Another participant concurred, “The use of 
risk assessments prevents decision makers from falling back on implicit biases that may cause them to 
assume that individuals of color are more dangerous and more in need of detention. Overall, they are a 
good tool to reduce racial disparities and jail detentions while preserving public safety.”
Some jurisdictions have successfully used RAIs to reduce incarceration and racial disparities: 
•	 Mecklenburg	County,	N.C.,	developed	a	pretrial	risk	assessment	tool	in	2010.	Their	pretrial	
services agency uses it to make bail recommendations and determine appropriate levels of 
supervision for defendants waiting for trial. Within two years, the county reduced its daily jail 
population by 33 percent and decreased its average monetary bond amount by 30 percent.91 A 
scholar at the Roundtable explained the significance of such reform: “Considering flight risk 
and danger to the community instead of ability to pay a monetary bail amount has a huge 
impact on the racial composition of pretrial detainees, since socioeconomic status and race 
tend to overlap in the justice system.”
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•	 Portland,	Ore.,	 similarly	piloted	 an	RAI	 to	use	 in	 juvenile	detention.	 It	 specifically	 sought	
to use race neutral factors, for example eliminating the use of “good family structure” as a 
factor because it had a racially disparate impact and replacing it with “engaging in productive 
activity” (which could include school, training, or part-time employment). Detention for 
juveniles dropped by 36 percent in five years after making this simple change. Within 12 years, 
the release rate for African Americans at initial screening rose from 44 to 51 percent and release 
at preliminary hearings increased from 24 to 33 percent.92 These numbers were more in line 
with the rates for white defendants before the RAI was implemented.
Bolster and Expand Pretrial Services Programs 
Participants also recommended increasing resources for existing pretrial services programs. As one 
advocate explained, “We’ve known for 50 years that pretrial services would reduce incarceration, but 
some jurisdictions still don’t have pretrial services programs. We’ve got to get people to adopt the 
techniques that work.” 
Examples of successful pretrial services programs abound: 
•	 New	 York	 City’s	 Criminal	 Justice	 Agency	 provides	 defendants	 with	 pretrial	 services.	 It	
conducts pre-arraignment interviews, makes recommendations for pretrial release based on 
risk assessments, and notifies defendants about court appearances. The Agency monitors its 
performance and revises its services as necessary. In 2013, arraignment judges followed the 
Agency’s recommendation for pretrial release without bail in 92 percent of misdemeanor cases 
and 61 percent of felony cases reviewed by the Agency.93 
•	 Washington,	 D.C.’s	 Pretrial	 Services	 Agency	 provides	 defendants	 with	 services	 to	 reduce	
recidivism, including employment services and drug treatment. The agency conducts robust 
research to evaluate its results. It has met or exceeded most of its established targets, and is 
lauded as a national model. In 2014, 89 percent of released defendants remained arrest free.94 
•	 In	2012,	Colorado	introduced	an	RAI	into	their	pretrial	services	program	for	those	arrested	and	
booked into jails. The tool helped standardize pretrial services recommendations.95 Defendants 
assessed for risk and supervised pretrial were more than three times more likely to be released 
before trial compared to those who were not assessed. Participation in the pretrial services 
program — with use of the RAI — reduced the risk of incarceration by 34 percent. African 
American defendants who received pretrial services were more than 1.5 times as likely to have 
their cases dismissed compared to African American defendants not receiving those services.96 
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2. Divert Low-Level Offenders from Jail
Most participants agreed that changes to law enforcement strategies could reduce racial disparities. 
Diversion programs — which divert individuals from the standard arrest-detention-incarceration cycle — 
are one effective reform. They enable offenders to access needed social services when appropriate instead 
of simply landing behind bars. They continue to protect public safety, as these social services often reduce 
recidivism, while also reducing the jail population and increasing life outcomes for individuals. 
A law enforcement representative at the Roundtable noted, “We all need to focus on diversion. Both 
police and prosecutors need more programs and practices that encourage us to divert people when 
possible.” Participants recommended increasing diversion programs at two specific points.
Expand Pre-Arrest Diversion Programs
Several jurisdictions have developed programs to encourage police officers to divert individuals toward 
treatment in lieu of arrest. 
•	 Seattle’s	Law	Enforcement	Assisted	Diversion	(LEAD)	is	a	prime	example.	LEAD	allows	and	
encourages police officers to direct people suspected of low-level crimes, particularly drug 
crimes and prostitution, into community-based treatment or services instead of arresting and 
jailing them. A 2015 University of Washington report found that participants were up to 60 
percent less likely to be arrested for a new crime within the first six months of entering the 
program, and 58 percent less likely to be arrested in the future overall.97 
•	 In	High	Point,	N.C.,	law	enforcement	worked	with	the	community	to	institute	an	intervention	
program in 2004 to eliminate open air drug markets and reduce violence. Law enforcement 
first identifies gang members at high risk of selling drugs or engaging in violence. They then 
meet with these individuals, providing them the option of either: continuing their criminal 
activity and facing immediate arrest, or ending the offending activity. If the individual chooses 
the latter, no punitive action is taken. Instead, the agencies conduct an RAI and connect 
the individual with needed treatment or services. A 2012 National Institute of Justice study 
concluded that the High Point program reduced violence in target areas.98 It also allows 
individuals to avoid arrest and further criminal justice processing.
Participants agreed that practices providing police with alternatives to arrest should be expanded. As a 
local prosecutor said, “Why don’t all police departments have diversion programs? We need to empower 
police to divert people at the earliest possible point to avoid clogging up the system with low-level cases.”
Increase Pre-Charge and Pretrial Diversion Programs
Participants also suggested increasing diversion programs in prosecutors’ offices. There are two types of 
prosecutorial diversion programs. In pre-charge programs, prosecutors have discretion to divert individuals 
to treatment or other services rather than prosecute. In pretrial programs, defendants are formally charged 
with a crime, but prosecutors agree to drop those charges upon completion of a program. 
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A few examples of successful programs:
•	 Hennepin	County,	Minn.	has	a	successful	pre-charge	and	pretrial	diversion	program.	People	
with limited criminal histories are eligible for the pre-charge program. If they complete 
the program, they avoid new criminal charges.99 The county also has two pretrial diversion 
programs: one for defendants facing felony property or drug offenses, and one for defendants 
facing misdemeanor offenses. In both, participants must attend meetings with case managers 
and meet supervision conditions, such as community service or random drug testing. If they 
complete the program, prosecutors dismiss the criminal charges.100
•	 The	prosecutor’s	office	in	Thurston	County,	Wash.,	set	up	a	pre-charge	diversion	program	in	
2009. Anyone facing a misdemeanor offense can choose to enroll in the diversion program 
instead of being prosecuted for the offense. Approximately 70 percent of defendants complete 
the program, avoiding a new criminal charge. In the first year, cases filed decreased by 22 
percent. As one prosecutor in the county stated, “Pre-charge diversion lets our prosecutors 
focus on the more serious crimes.”101 Notably, both the Hennepin and Thurston County 
programs partnered with local nonprofits to provide participants with needed services.
Several participants expressed concern that the eligibility criteria for diversion programs can have racially 
disparate effects. For example, many diversion programs are limited to individuals who committed 
first-time and low-level offenses. But, as one participant explained, “Race is baked into whether or not 
someone has a prior record. If you live in an urban community of color, there are more police patrolling 
your streets than in a white upper-middle class suburb. So you are naturally more likely to be stopped 
or arrested.” 
Scholar Traci Schlesinger conducted a study, published in 2013, on pretrial diversion in felony cases in 
urban counties from 1990 to 2006. Schlesinger found that, even controlling for criminal history and 
offense severity, black defendants were 28 percent less likely and Hispanics about 13 percent less likely 
to receive pretrial diversion compared to similarly situated white defendants.102 A study of a diversion 
program in Travis County, Texas, also found disparities. African Americans, who make up 32 percent of 
felony arrestees, accounted for only 9 percent of the 131 defendants accepted into the pretrial diversion 
program. Applications were lower among African Americans — only 16 African- American defendants 
applied in that time period. Defense counsel and former local judges attributed the low number of 
applicants to a deterrent effect that played out more acutely for African Americans.103 
In response to this concern, participants emphasized that diversionary programs need to ensure equal 
treatment of different races. One member of law enforcement explained, “We need to make sure that 
our diversion programs do not contribute to the racial disparities. For example, rules that make people 
ineligible for these programs because of a previous record need to be reexamined when we know such 
a condition has a racially biased effect.” Another researcher noted: “The key is collecting data on the 
results of diversion programs.” It may also require expanding criteria to ensure they are not racially 
biased in any way. Conditions and program details should also be modified to eliminate any racial 
disparities observed in results. Some jurisdictions have taken steps in this direction by introducing RAIs 
as parts of the diversion programs.104 
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3. Create Incentives and Success Measures to Reduce Racial Disparities 
Reducing racial disparities while reducing jail populations requires clearly defined criteria and 
measurable goals. However, participants recognized that the political will and resources to address 
the drivers of racial disparities will vary among jurisdictions. Accordingly, they recommended that 
jurisdictions identify specific drivers of racial disparities and then create measures of success. 
Identify Drivers
As a first step, jurisdictions should conduct a wholesale examination to pinpoint where disparities 
are the most pervasive. At the Roundtable, a leader of a criminal justice advocacy group stressed the 
importance of “targeting the actual drivers of disparities.” Reflecting on personal experience, he noted, 
“Sometimes we suspect that disparities derive from a particular practice and then focus on reforming 
that practice. But sometimes our guesses are incorrect. Focusing reform efforts on the wrong practice 
wastes effort and misses an opportunity to solve the real problem.” 
For this reason, it is critical to assess, through data, how these disparities are created in each jurisdiction. 
This is an ideal task for a cross-departmental task force (a recommendation discussed below). One 
participant observed, “Each county needs to take an inventory to assess who is in their system. In my 
experience, taking an inward look at your own system is the first step to changing practices. County 
jails generally haven’t yet taken on these types of self-assessments.” Another participant with previous 
experience working with jurisdictions to reduce racial disparities agreed, “We avoided some of the 
political sensitivities involved in discussing racialized issues by going straight to collecting data in our 
jurisdiction. Every jurisdiction needs to have data to help identify where there is a problem.” A law 
enforcement official agreed: “Each jurisdiction needs to start with baseline data — whether it’s good, 
bad, or indifferent — to inform the work that they are going to do going forward.”
Collecting data to identify the specific practices that drive racial disparities is a critical first step.
Create Specific Goals and Success Measures
Participants agreed that any implemented policy or practice should be accompanied by clear, measurable 
goals that identify “success” toward reducing disparities. As it’s often said, “what gets measured, 
gets done.”105 Many participants at the convening — from defense counsel to prosecutors to law 
enforcement officials to advocates — focused on the need for rigorous success measures. Goals could 
include decreasing racial disparities by a certain percentage within a certain time frame, or reforming 
practices identified as problematic within a specified time period. 
One participant from the judiciary warned that “people will get frustrated if progress is not achieved.” 
Clear goals, with progress measured over time, are necessary to achieve change. They provide valuable 
feedback to government actors and the public about whether and to what extent a reform is addressing a 
problem. They also ensure common goals are achieved across different jurisdictions. As one participant 
said, “It is hard to mandate something across dozens of counties in a state. It’s easier to create a metric 
that you want all jurisdictions to meet, then let each jurisdiction come up with their unique ways to 
achieve that goal.”
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When implementing measures to reduce racial disparities, jurisdictions should also work to eliminate 
harmful measures that focus on an increase in volume. Volume-based measures such as the number of 
tickets, citations, arrests, convictions, or probation or parole revocations — can incentivize government 
actors to increase these numbers, thereby increasing the number of people processed through the 
system. They can interfere with progress toward reducing jail populations and the racial disparities 
found within them. 
Create Incentives 
One of the most important effects of success measures: they create incentives that drive individual 
decision making toward common goals. If people know their performance is measured based on clear 
goals, they will drive toward those goals. Former Chairman of President George W. Bush’s Council 
of Economic Advisors and Harvard Prof. N. Gregory Mankiw articulates this fundamental tenet in 
Principles of Economics, one of the most widely used introductory economics textbooks. He says: “People 
respond to incentives. The rest is commentary.” Mankiw goes on to note that “[w]hen policymakers 
fail to consider how their policies affect incentives, they often end up with results they did not intend.” 
In the case of racial disparities in the criminal justice system, unintended consequences helped create 
them. Clarity about desired outcomes can help reduce them. 
Roundtable participants echoed this approach throughout the two-day convening. A leading prosecutor 
said: “We need measures to create incentives.” A participant from law enforcement urged, “Using 
success measures that count volume are closely tied to the explosion in incarceration.” A criminal 
justice advocate put it this way: “The challenge is that we need data to measure the impact of initiatives. 
Without the data, we cannot measure success.” A member of the defense bar added, “We need to figure 
out the qualitative change we want to see. And then figure out a way to measure that to ensure agencies 
prioritize working toward this change.”
4. Create Cross-Departmental Task Forces to Reduce Racial Disparities
Participants agreed that cross-departmental task forces can be a valuable way to create change. Because 
so many different criminal justice actors play parts in producing the racial disparities reflected in jails, 
participants strongly believed that these actors need to communicate with one another and work toward 
common goals to achieve reform. As one participant stated, “It’s far too easy for a reform at stage one 
of the system to be undone at a later stage unless we’re all sitting around the table together deciding 
together what our goals should be and how we want to get there. Everyone needs to be on the same 
page with what we are trying to do.”
A cross-departmental task force can set goals for the jurisdiction, recommend and consider changes to 
practices of different departments, oversee the implementation of changes, and conduct periodic assessments. 
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Participants identified four pillars of an effective task force. 
Recruit Varied Members
Roundtable participants were vocal about the need for a variety of criminal justice actors with “decision 
making authority” to sit on the task force. Suggestions for members included: senior and mid-level 
representatives of the prosecutor’s office, probation office, and local sheriff’s office; a local judge, public 
defender, community leader, and researcher or academic from a local institution. Other members could 
include school officials, elected officials, victim advocates, or advocates for the formerly incarcerated. 
A racial justice advocate emphasized, “The voices at the table need to be more than just perfunctory. 
Advocates for community members should be included so that other stakeholders can get a better 
understanding of how changes may affect the communities in question.” 
Develop Outcome-Driven Strategies 
The task force must clearly define its purpose and the outcomes sought. As a state advocate explained, 
“Members must come up with their own strategies, their own understanding of racial disparities, and their 
own ideas about solutions. By working together, they feel ownership over and buy into the goals.” One 
corrections official explained, “A coherent, empowered collaborative team of system partners with deliberate, 
guiding principles can identify particular practices that lead to racial disparities and work to reform them.”
Identify Specific Problematic Practices and Policies, and Recommend Reforms 
The task force should conduct a comprehensive review of the local justice system to identify specific 
practices and policies that drive racial disparities. These may include: disparate enforcement of petty 
offenses, excessive stop-and-frisk tactics, revenue-driven enforcement of low-level offenses, or harsh bail 
bond schedules that disproportionately affect communities of color. Because a task force cuts across 
departments, it is well-suited to conduct the analysis of different policies. 
One participant from law enforcement explained, “It is critical that jurisdictions have an explicit 
dialogue about what policies need to change to get to the outcomes desired. That should happen before 
implementation.” Another participant added, “Policy evaluation is important. A jurisdiction should 
know, for example, if they are using citations instead of arrests and whether there are racial disparities 
playing out in that practice. Conducting an evaluation of different policies facilitates that awareness.” 
Once the task force identifies problematic policies, it should work with criminal justice agencies to 
introduce changes. The task force can also help develop innovations in policy changes, seek ideas from 
other jurisdictions, or consult national reform organizations or research groups. 
Conduct Consistent, Periodic Assessments 
Roundtable participants recommended that a task force meet periodically to assess whether recommended 
changes are advancing the defined goals. This includes reviewing policies through measurable evidence, which 
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holds the task force accountable. As one corrections official explained, “Successful collaboration requires 
consistent communication and follow-up between task force members. Perhaps this can happen semi-
annually.” A participant who had served on a similar task force noted that assessments “keep people on task.” 
Experience shows that coordination can help agencies achieve better outcomes than when they work 
independently. 
•	 A	Roundtable	participant	 in	 law	enforcement	pointed	to	the	success	of	Greenville,	N.C.,	as	an	
example. Police Chief Hassan Aden changed the culture of his department by inviting community 
members to attend and participate in strategic planning meetings. The jointly-devised plan helped 
reduce crime, increased community engagement, and increased economic development. The 
number of citizen complaints against police plummeted almost immediately.106 The law enforcement 
participant observed: “Inviting the community to places that they haven’t been before creates an 
encouraging opportunity for change. What Greenville did can be replicated in other cities.” 
•	 In	Cincinnati,	Ohio,	the	police	department,	police	union,	and	community	leaders	came	together	
to formulate and implement a Collaborative Agreement in 2002. Created in response to tension 
between police and communities of color, the agreement focused on “problem-oriented policing.” 
This strategy requires police and communities to jointly define the problems and determine how to 
resolve them. The new strategy reduced crime and improved community relations.107 
5. Require Training for All System Actors to Overcome Implicit Racial Bias 
During the Roundtable, participants frequently emphasized the need for criminal justice actors to be 
aware of their own unintentional biases. One representative from law enforcement explained, “We need 
implicit bias training for all decision makers. This bias plays out at all decision points, and countering 
it can change practices at all decision points.” Another participant urged: “Anyone who exercises 
discretion in the justice system,” from police to prosecution to defense counsel, “should understand the 
nuanced causes of disparities in their locality and the role that implicit bias may unintentionally play to 
create or exacerbate those disparities.” 
Implicit bias is a universal response by all people of all races.108 Encouragingly, studies show that when 
people become aware of the potential for prejudice, they are usually willing to correct it.109 Providing 
trainings to actors that explains implicit bias can help system actors become aware of their unconscious 
prejudices and help them avoid acting upon those biases. 
Participants identified two critical components of effective implicit bias trainings: the right substance 
and the right people. 
Rigorous Substance 
Participants urged that implicit bias training include discussions of bias, decision making, and the 
intersection between race and the criminal justice system. As one law enforcement representative 
explained: “We need to have introductory conversations about race and the criminal justice system 
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before getting in the weeds about implicit bias. If we don’t start with the recruits in the police academy 
or their supervisors who demand that officers make 16 arrests today, outcomes will not change.” 
Another law enforcement official agreed: “Decision makers don’t often get trained on how best to use 
discretion. We need to train police on how to fire their weapon and how to drive their car. We also need 
to train them to see how unconscious biases affect their own actions and thoughts and what steps to 
take in order to address that.” 
Participants across the board agreed that such trainings can help reduce the influence of racial bias at every 
decision point, including police enforcement of offenses, prosecutorial charging practices, probation and 
parole revocation proceedings, judicial sentencing determinations, and fees and fines collection. 
The following jurisdictions were identified as successful models to consider: 
•	 Mecklenburg	County,	N.C.,	has	a	two-day	training	called	“Dismantling	Racism.”	This	intensive	
workshop is co-hosted by the county’s collaborative leadership group on racial disparities in 
juvenile justice and the Racial Equity Institute. Participants include criminal justice actors, 
service providers, and community members including: educators, child welfare advocates, law 
enforcement, and judicial representatives. The workshop provides tools to “understand[] and 
eliminat[e] racial inequities, disparities and disproportionality within our society.”110 As a local 
judge explained at the Roundtable, “The training addresses implicit bias, explains historical and 
individual oppression, and talks about the neighborhoods where most offenders come from and 
what pressures they face there. We then talked about how everybody in the room contributes 
to racial disparities together — individually and collectively. My training had five to ten police 
officers, five to ten school principals and administrators, five to ten court professionals, and five 
district attorneys. And it really helped us. It provided a critical framework and a space for us to 
understand racial bias without feeling attacked personally.” 
•	 Many	 jurisdictions,	 including	 Durham,	 N.C.,	 Madison,	 Wisc.,	 and	 Las	 Vegas,	 Nev.,	 have	
participated in the Fair and Impartial Policing training program. The program “trains officers on 
the effect of implicit bias and gives them information and skills they need to reduce and manage 
their biases.” It offers five separate curricula for different ranks of police — including academy 
recruits and patrol officers, first-line supervisors, mid-managers, command-level personnel, and 
law enforcement trainers — to better appreciate the nuances faced by each group. For example, 
the supervisor training provides guidance on how to identify biases in decision making and 
develop effective ways to speak about bias to the public and to the media.111 
Involvement of all Actors 
Several participants emphasized the importance of bringing the right people into the conversation. 
A participant in law enforcement said, “Trainings are best led by someone who works within the 
criminal justice system, ideally in that same jurisdiction. Otherwise, attendees may find the sessions 
disconnected from their jurisdiction and their experiences, which may make them quicker to dismiss 
the value of the training.” 
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Since implicit bias may be a factor at every stage of the criminal justice process, Roundtable participants 
recommended providing trainings to the full array of decision makers in the same session. There was 
broad agreement that police officers, police administration, court personnel, emergency response teams, 
probation officers, parole board members, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and correctional officers could 
all benefit. A participant from the judiciary observed, “Implicit bias training provides a base understanding 
and base language for actors to discuss race and racial disparities. It is amazing what has developed in 
my jurisdiction once we all developed a base language to speak about this. It was very helpful to have 
different actors in the same room talking about disparities to help us understand how biases played 
out at different stages.” He urged that trainings include more than just criminal justice actors. As he 
explained, “Incorporating the broadest scope of people possible ensures accountability across fields.” A law 
enforcement official agreed: “We have to look at the big picture to see if other things need to be addressed. 
That cannot happen unless and until all justice actors and the community gets involved.” 
6. Encourage Prosecutors to Prioritize Serious and Violent Offenses 
Petty offenses are the primary gateway to the criminal justice system. Each year, more than 10 million 
misdemeanor cases are filed, comprising almost 80 percent of state dockets.112 These offenses represent 
the lion’s share of prosecutors’ and defenders’ caseloads, and half of probation officer cases.113 The almost 
unmanageable case dockets in misdemeanor courts have caused prosecutors, judges, and even defense 
attorneys to move defendants through the system with “almost like an assembly-line mentality.”114 This 
practice can easily transform minor offenses into formal criminalization and jail time.115 
Prosecutors retain vast discretion. They decide whether to charge an individual with a crime, what 
charges to bring, and whether to negotiate a plea deal or continue to trial. That discretion can be used 
to refocus prosecutorial practices. As mentioned in Part I, Roundtable participants emphasized that a 
focus on enforcing low-level offenses helps fuel racial disparities while limiting the resources available 
to address serious crimes. As one criminal justice advocate explained, “When we talk about the policies 
and practices that are driving racial disparities in jail populations, it’s partly a question of decision 
making by practitioners in the system, and it’s partly a question of resources and priority setting.” 
Participants agreed that refocusing prosecutorial attention on serious and violent crimes would reduce 
time in jail for those who may not need to be incarcerated. Many noted that the problem may be 
rooted, in part, in a culture that conflates “success” with the number of prosecutions and convictions. 
Participants urged a change to prosecutorial performance evaluations. As one local prosecutor explained, 
“Measures of success for prosecutors must change. My jurisdiction does not consider an 80 percent 
prosecution rate a good thing. We are proud of lower prosecution rates because it demonstrates that we 
are being thoughtful about who needs to be prosecuted.” By shifting priorities and related incentives — 
such as, for example, rewarding prosecutors for diverting low-level offenders from incarceration when 
appropriate — prosecutors can play a pivotal role in reducing jail populations.116 
Prosecutors are starting to agree that they can and should prioritize reducing violent and serious crime, 
reducing incarceration, and reducing recidivism instead of focusing on increasing conviction rates and 
sentence lengths. In 2014, the Brennan Center convened a Blue Ribbon Panel of current and former 
federal prosecutors to devise new priorities for prosecutors.117 Though the Panel focused on how federal 
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prosecutors can change practices, its recommendations also apply to local offices. It recommended that 
prosecutor’s offices institute new priorities, including the primary goal of reducing violent and serious 
crime. It also developed success measures to achieve these goals, including: changes in violent crime 
rates, percent of serious and violent crime cases on office dockets, and percent of community reporting 
feeling safe.118
Some local jurisdictions have experimented with shifting their office’s priorities:
•	 The	San	Francisco	District	Attorney’s	Office	created	Neighborhood	Courts	and	Neighborhood	
Prosecutors in 2011. Rather than face criminal prosecution, low-level misdemeanor defendants 
face a panel of community residents serving as voluntary adjudicators. Citizens determine the 
impact of a crime on the community and issue responses, such as community service or restitution. 
Between 2011 and 2013, drug cases in San Francisco declined by almost 50 percent and the jail 
population declined by almost 10 percent.119 The program contributed to this decline. 
•	 In	1998,	the	District	Attorney’s	Office	in	Brooklyn,	N.Y.,	implemented	Treatment	Alternatives	
for Dually Diagnosed Defendants (TADD). The program originally targeted offenders with 
both mental health and substance abuse issues and later expanded to include those suffering 
from a serious mental illness. To enter TADD, defendants were required to plead guilty and 
participate in a rigorous treatment program.120 
By diverting low level offenders, these offices can prioritize their resources to prosecute violent and 
serious crimes. Applying this concept to local prosecutors’ offices generally will help reduce the jail 
population and disparities while continuing to protect public safety. 
7. Increase Indigent Representation in Misdemeanor Offenses 
Participants emphasized the need for access to meaningful indigent representation, particularly in 
misdemeanor cases. Of the approximate 10 million misdemeanor cases filed annually, almost 25 percent 
of defendants go before a judge without a lawyer.121 Theoretically, public defenders are guaranteed 
for all cases where a criminal defendant faces a term of incarceration. Nevertheless, indigent counsel 
is often denied due to court practices, overwhelming caseloads, or a lack of adequate government 
resources for public defense.122 
Roundtable participants agreed that decreasing misdemeanor convictions can significantly reduce jail 
populations. Most defendants enter plea agreements for such low-level offenses. Access to counsel could play 
a role in reducing these convictions. As the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) 
explained in a 2011 report, even simple misdemeanor cases can present complex legal questions that can 
make a difference between innocence or guilt and incarceration or release. “Attentive defense counsel is 
particularly important in misdemeanor courts,” the report noted, “because the volume of cases means that 
prosecutors and judges too often and too easily can overlook factual issues.”123 With more than 95 percent 
of cases resulting in plea agreements, securing representation before appearing in court is critical.124 And yet, 
NACDL reported that in over three-quarters of counties defendants were appointed counsel in fewer than 
20 percent of misdemeanor cases where jail time was an available punishment.125 
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Legal scholar Alexandra Natapoff found that, without meaningful and adequate legal representation, 
vulnerable people — including people suffering from substance abuse, people lacking basic literacy and 
information processing skills, people with mental health problems, and the poor — are more likely to 
plead guilty, regardless of innocence or guilt.126 Given these realities, the need for representation is critical. 
Participants proposed three specific reforms to improve indigent defense in misdemeanor cases. 
Provide Representation Earlier 
Participants agreed that increasing access to indigent defense at the early stages of a case — such as at arraignments 
and bail hearings — would reduce pressures to plead guilty. As a member of the defense bar explained, “If 
you want to talk about disparity and its impact on society, you have to look at the impact of misdemeanor 
convictions on people without lawyers in today’s ‘meet-and-plead’ justice system. Whether someone should be 
released often comes up in plea bargaining — as in, if you plead guilty now you can go home, but if you don’t 
then you will be incarcerated for at least five days. Defense attorneys can combat the effect that this has on case 
disposition if they intervene at earlier stages.” A former local prosecutor agreed, noting, “Jurisdictions need to 
allocate resources to defense, too. It’s critical to ensure that we have just outcomes.”
Enforce Case Load Limits 
Recent litigation and statewide reforms have set caseload limits for local public defense offices. While 
national standards limit felony cases to 150 a year per attorney, some public defense attorneys juggle 
caseloads ranging from 500 to 800 a year. Such high volume makes it extremely difficult to perform 
basic legal tasks to ensure clients receive quality representation. 
One solution: caseload limitations. But Roundtable participants emphasized that these limits are not 
effective unless rigorously enforced. Some jurisdictions have devised methods to enforce standards: 
•	 In	 Washington	 state,	 some	 counties	 implemented	 caseload	 guidelines	 and	 tied	 them	 to	
funding for defense services. Those defenders offices received additional funding when their 
total number of cases increased.127 
•	 In	2008	and	2009,	the	New	Hampshire	Public	Defender	entered	into	an	agreement	with	the	
state’s Judicial Council. The agreement required attorneys to maintain a maximum case load of 
55 open and active cases.128 The Council provides accountability and an enforcement mechanism. 
Collect Data and Allocate Resources 
Roundtable participants cited a lack of data on how well public defenders achieved successful outcomes for 
their clients. Some noted it would be valuable, in particular, to know the percent of indigent defendants 
who have representation at early stages such as arraignment, and how that correlates to case outcomes. 
Collecting relevant data and using it to inform resource allocation is key. As one local prosecutor 
explained, “If we want the defense bar to do things differently, we’ve got to pour additional resources 
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into it and change measurements. Defense counsel should not be measured based on how many cases 
they process. Rather, they should be measured based on case outcomes. Did their services reduce jail 
sentences? We need concrete data on this.” 
Participants agreed that implementing reforms to indigent defense representation could reduce the 
effects of law enforcement focusing on low level offenses, reduce pretrial detention, and reduce length 
of sentences for low level offenses. 
8.  Develop “Bench Cards” for Judges to Combat Implicit Bias and Reduce unnecessary 
Jail usage
Bench cards are checklists that serve as reference guides for judges. Typically one-to-three pages long, 
they explain the legal obligation of a judge and provide a list of questions for judges to use when making 
decisions.
These documents include explicit, concrete criteria for decision-making, such as: 
•	 “Best Practices” Criteria: These list necessary components for specific hearings. The card may list 
instances where defendants should have public defenders present, like a probation revocation 
hearing. The card may also include reminders about the general process for specific hearings, such 
as the circumstances necessary to accept waiver of counsel or hold someone in contempt of court. 
•	 Implicit Bias Questions: These provide judges with questions to reduce the effect of implicit 
racial bias in decision making. For example, some checklists ask judges to “imagin[e] how one 
would evaluate the [defendant] if he or she belonged to a different, non-stigmatized group.” 
They also create strategies to control for implicit bias such as “if-then plans” to raise awareness 
of potential bias in thinking. The questions are designed to “prompt decision makers to more 
systematically reflect on and scrutinize the reasoning behind any decision for traces of possible 
bias.” Such questions, of course, only make sense in tandem with implicit bias training. 
Research suggests that judges who do not receive implicit bias training can actually increase 
biases in decision making if prompted by such questions without proper understanding.129
•	 List of Alternatives to Incarceration: These forms provide judges with a list of alternative 
punishments other than incarceration for low-level offenses, like failure to pay court-imposed 
fees or contempt of court. For example, it may explain how judges can convert community 
service hours to account for unpaid court costs, or list impermissible methods of enforcement 
for debt collection.130 
Bench cards work well for judges who are susceptible to conditions in hearings that increase the 
likelihood of implicit bias influencing their decisions. These include ambiguity making many decisions 
in a short time, and distracting circumstances (including fatigue, backlogged or diverse caseloads) 
that create time pressure and force judges to make complex decisions quickly.131 These circumstances 
increase the likelihood that judges rely on stereotypes to make those decisions. 
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Roundtable participants enthusiastically endorsed instituting bench cards for judges. A prosecutor 
explained, “Checklists should inform, not replace, discretion. They help judges decide what to do 
through a more orderly and self-aware process.” According to a member of the judiciary who uses bench 
cards, “Specific research-based tools can mitigate implicit bias. Things like checklists, with their ‘check 
your bias at the door’ internal reflection questions, are one of those tools. Bench cards are extremely 
valuable for judges in court hearings.” 
Participants pointed to several examples of successful bench card introduction: 
•	 In	the	juvenile	context,	several	jurisdictions	have	implemented	version	of	the	Courts	Catalyzing	
Change Preliminary Protective Hearing Benchcard, including Los Angeles County, Omaha, 
Neb., Portland, Ore., and Mecklenburg County, N.C. The cards prompt judges to consider 
key questions regarding the appropriateness of foster care, factors that might prevent a child 
from being sent home, and direct questions of reflection to make judges aware of biases in their 
decision making process. 
•	 Similarly,	the	National	Council	of	Juvenile	and	Family	Court	Judges	and	Dependency	Court	
implemented bench cards for judges to help mitigate implicit bias in decisions where children 
were placed in custody. Research shows that use of this card increased the likelihood that a 
judge would place a child with a parent or relative as opposed to placing them in foster care.132 
•	 Ohio	 recently	 created	 bench	 cards	 to	 inform	 judges	 of	 their	 options	 for	 alternatives	 to	
incarceration when a defendant does not pay court-imposed fees or fines.133 These alternatives 
include community service, enforcement through civil judgment, and cancellation of debt. 
Since the introduction of bench cards, there have been fewer complaints about indigent 
defendants jailed because they could not afford to pay their debts.134 
•	 In	DeKalb	County,	Ga.,	judges	will	start	using	bench	cards	to	curb	incarceration	for	failure	
to pay criminal justice debt. This practice was instituted as part of a settlement in a federal 
lawsuit that challenged the county’s debt collection practices. The cards specify the process that 
judge’s should take to determine whether a probationer has the ability to pay criminal justice 
debt. They also provide instructions for judges to preserve a defendant’s right to counsel during 
hearings for failure to pay court debts.135
Roundtable participants proposed bench cards to address several issues highlighted in this report, 
including tackling implicit racial bias and reducing jail populations. As one participant explained: 
“Innovative reforms are sometimes as simple as implementing things we talked about or know work for 
years. Sometimes it’s about common sense application.” 
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Figure 5: Order Requiring Bench Cards in Dekalb County Recorder’s Court.136
DEKALB COUNTY COLLECTION OF FINES AND COURT FEES
All DeKalb County Recorder’s Court judges adjudicating misdemeanor probation revocation proceedings 
shall abide by the described procedures:
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
All probationers have a right to counsel (which 
may include a public defender or court-appointed 
attorney) in probation revocation proceedings.
The court MAY NOT accept a written or oral waiver 
of the right to counsel without FIRST informing the 
probationer of the dangers of proceeding without 
counsel and ensuring that any waiver of the right to 
counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
If a probationer seeks to waive his right to counsel, 
the court must conduct a colloquy on the record to 
inform the probationer:
•	 	That the probationer has a right to a court-
appointed attorney or public defender 
at no cost, if he cannot afford to retain an 
attorney;
•	 	That the $50 fee normally charged for 
representation by the DeKalb County 
Public Defender may be waived for those 
who cannot afford to pay;
•	 	Of the risks and dangers of proceeding 
without counsel; including the risk of 
incarceration and the maximum jail time 
that may be imposed if the probationer is 
determined to have violated probation; and
•	 	Of the benefits of representation by 
counsel, including assistance with asserting 
constitutional rights, preparing and 
presenting financial hardship documentation 
to the court, arguing in favor of alternatives 
to incarceration, and vigorous advocacy 
against the imposition of jail as punishment 
for probation violation.
If, after being so informed, a probationer states a desire 
to waive his right to counsel, the court must engage in 
a colloquy and make a determination, supported by 
findings of fact on the record and set forth in an order 
that waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Written waiver of the right to counsel on a 
probation revocation petition or other document is 
NOT ACCEPTABLE without such a colloquy and 
findings of fact made on the record.
ENFORCING FINES BY IMPOSING JAIL
A probationer charged with failure to pay may be 
jailed only if (s)he has willfully failed to pay or failed to 
make reasonable efforts to acquire the resources to pay, 
AND no adequate alternative to incarceration exists.
Prior to revoking probation and committing a 
probationer to jail for nonpayment of fines, the court 
must conduct an economic ability-to-pay hearing.
To conduct such a bearing, the court shall
•	 	Inquire and make a determination of 
probationer’s ability to pay a fine, which 
shall address the probationer’s ability to pay 
and the income, assets, debts, and financial 
responsibilities presented by the probationer;
•	 	Inquire and make a determination of the 
reasonableness of a probationer’s efforts 
to acquire resources to pay a fine, which 
shall take into account efforts to secure 
employment and borrow money, as well as 
limitations to the probationer’s ability to 
secure employment and borrow money;
•	 	Consider and make a determination of the 
adequacy of alternatives to incarceration, 
including a reduction or waiver of fines 
and fees, an extension of time to pay, and 
community services in the event that a 
probationer is determined to lack ability to 
pay despite having made reasonable efforts to 
acquire resources.
Each of the determinations shall be supported by 
findings of fact on the record and set forth in a 
written order.
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CONCLuSION
Though reducing racial disparities in local justice systems is a challenging task, it is not impossible. 
Roundtable participants universally shared a sense of optimism as they weighed a wide range of 
solutions. 
The eight recommendations set forth in this report are only a starting point for jurisdictions seeking 
to meet the goals of reducing unnecessary incarceration and reducing racial and ethnic disparities. The 
first step is to recognize that racial disparities exist, but are not necessary. Crime, incarceration, and 
disparities can all be reduced together. The second step is action. Changes to state and federal laws are 
vital. Changing local practices and individual decision making in local jurisdictions is also key. This 
report seeks to provide a framework for local decision makers to achieve that goal.
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of specified serious crimes.26 Wiretaps had to be authorized by a judge or magistrate who would evaluate 
whether there was probable cause to believe that one of these crimes had been, was being, or was about 
to be committed.27 In keeping with the Katz footnote, however, Title III refrained from explicitly 
regulating national security surveillance.28
2. National Security Surveillance
In the 1972 case United States v. U.S. District Court (known as the “Keith” case after the district court 
judge), the Supreme Court partially addressed the question that Katz and Title III avoided: it held that 
surveillance of domestic organizations for national security purposes did require a warrant.29 But the 
Court expressly left open — and has never ruled on — the question of whether a different rule might 
apply if the government were seeking intelligence about a foreign power or its agent.
Keith involved three anti-war activists charged with participating in a conspiracy to destroy government 
property. When the defendants sought to suppress evidence obtained through wiretaps, the government 
argued that it was entitled to tap their phones without a warrant because it sought to “gather intelligence 
information deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack 
and subvert the existing structure of the Government.”30 The Court rejected this argument, ruling that 
the Fourth Amendment required a warrant for surveillance “deemed necessary to protect the nation 
from attempts of domestic organizations.”31 The opinion made clear, however, that the Court was not 
passing judgment “on the scope of the President’s surveillance power with respect to the activities of 
foreign powers, within or without this country.”32
The Keith Court observed that national security cases “often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth 
Amendment values not present in cases of ‘ordinary’ crime. Though the investigative duty of the 
executive may be stronger in such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected 
speech” because the targets of official surveillance “may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their 
political beliefs.”33 Given the important separation of powers function historically served by warrants, 
the Court held that executive officials charged with enforcing the laws should not also decide when to 
employ “constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks.”34
Although it insisted on a warrant in domestic security cases, the Keith Court acknowledged that the 
standards and procedures surrounding the warrant requirement “may vary according to the governmental 
interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving protection.”35 The Court thus invited 
Congress to create special rules for domestic security surveillance. As examples, the Court suggested 
that different facts might support a showing of “probable cause”; that the warrant application could, 
“in sensitive cases,” be made to any member of a specially designated court; and that the duration and 
reporting requirements could be less strict.36
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